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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE CF UTAH

----------------------- ------------------------------- -------------------JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants
vs

Case No. 19186

CITY CF WEST JORDAN, UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent

-------------------------------------------------------------------------STATEMENT Of THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the claimed (the trial court found otherwise)
"unreasonableness" of a

municipal "impact fee" assessed and collected

from land developers within the City of West Jordan as a condition of
subdivision development approval; the facial constitutionality of the
"impact fee" ordinance has been previously upheld by decision of the Utah
Supreme Court.
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
This appeal presents the following issue: whether or not the trial
court,

following presentation of the Plaintiffs' evidence, properly

dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims and entered judgment in favor of the
Defendant

by

reason

of

the

Plaintiffs'

failure

to

prove,

by

a

perponderance of the evidence, their claims, including that the "impact
fee" assessed against them was "unreasonable."
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In

1978 the Plaintiffs filed this litigation to challenge the

constitutionality of a ordinance which provided that an "impact fee" be
paid by land-developers (subdividers).

In 1979 the Utah Supreme Court

upheld the facial constitutionality of the "impact fee" ordinance. Call vs
City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). [Hereinafter "Call
I"] However,

following Plaintiffs' petition for rehearing, the Supreme

Court in 1980 remanded the case for trial in the district court on the
issue of whether the impact fee assessed against the Plaintiffs was
"reasonable". Call vs City of West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah
1980). [Hereinafter "Call II"]

In

November

1981,

following

the

de11i;, I

hy

JrHlq<'

ll~11ks 1

of

Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class action certif1cat 10n, the PJ;ii11t i ffs
filed an interlocutory appeal on the class action issues. SuprPme Court
Docket No. 18098. That interlocutory appeal was denied without

formal

opinion. December 8, 1981.
Thereafter the Plaintiffs filed an original proceedrng 1n the Supreme
Court seeking a writ of mandamus

against the Honorable Jay E Banks,

Judge of the Third District Court, requiring hlm to enter formal findings
concerning his refusal to certify the class action.

Supreme Court Docket

No. 18217. This Court denied to issue the writ of mandamus.

February 10,

1982.
In

December

1982

the

trial

court,

following

presentation

of

Plaintiffs' evidence, dismissed Plaintiffs' claims, holding that the
Plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to sustain their burden
of proof. [The "Memorandum Decision" of the trial court is attached as
Appendix "A", herein.]
FACTS
The Plaintiffs ignore and gloss over the material facts involved in
this case. It is necessary for the Court to ex amine those facts to fully
appreciate these issues.
The City of West Jordan [hereinafter referred to as "City"], present
population of about 30,000, is located in the southwestern quarter of Salt
Lake County. In the mid-1970's the City became concerned with the problems
associated with the tremendous growth which was occurring within the city
limits. Record at

1533-1538.

Previously unimproved farmlands were transformed into residential
subdivisions. The City's population grew from 4000 in 1970 to 27 ,000 in
1980. That growth brought two problems. First, the increased population
placed increased demands upon existing recreational facilit1es. Secondly,
the improvement of the previously-unimproved farmlands increased the
flood-control problem.
In the mid-1970's, the City Planning and Zoning Commission regularly
required developers to "donate" to the City "green areas". Such "yreen
areas"

were to be

reserved

for

recreational

uses and parks.

These

donations were based upon a percentage of land-area developed;

the

percentage ranged from 5% to 10?;. This practice was done on an informal

4

ilR'il'i;

that

is,

was voluntary on the part of the developer and not

it

basPd upon an actual ordinance adopted by the City Council. See Record at
Vi 3 \_ 1 s 58' 1648-16 73.

In 1974,

the City Council commissioned the engineering firm of

Nielsen, Maxwell
City's

& Wangsgard of Salt Lake City to undertake a study of the

flood-control

needs

and

methods

to

solve

those

needs.

The

engineering study culminated in the thirty-five page document, "Master
Storm Drainage Plan for the City of West Jordan, Utah", dated November
1974. [Exhibit D-7) See also Record at 1563-1569.
In 1975 the City Council adopted the present "impact fee" ordinance.
The Ordinance requires the developers of land to donate to the City seven
percent of the value of the land developed to the City. The money so
developed is utilized for flood-control and recreation purposes.

The

City adopted a solution involving facilities called "detention basins."
These "basins" were to be strategically located throughout the community.
Some basins were engineered to be able to accomodate the run-off water
from more than one stiJdivision.

Into these basins would be routed the

run-off water collected from the individual subdivisions.

The run-off

water would accumulate in the basin immediately following a storm, but
would

thereafter

be

allowed

to

"trickle

off"

at

a

rate---through existing storm lines---following the storm.

controlled
The reduced

flow could be safely released into adjoining "receiving waters" (such as a
canal, a creek, or the Jordan River) without adversely creating a problem
for everyone downhill and downstream. The "basins" would be improved:
grass would be planted and recreation equipment (swings, slides, picnic
tables, etc.) would be located in the basin for use by the public at "good
weather" times.
Under

the

"impact

fee"

ordinance,

approximately

$525,000 was

collected from developers. This money was placed into a special account
(the "flood control" account) within the "General Fund" of the City.
Although over the years the account numbers of this "flood control"
account were changed to reflect changes in the sophistication of the
City's accounting controls, the actual concept of the special account did
not

change.

From

the

"flood

control"

account

the

City

expended

approximately $1,200,000 for capital expenditures for flood-control and
for parks and recreation projects. Evidence adduced at trial, even from
Plaintiffs'
expenditures

own
went

witness,
for

showed

items

that

other
5

none

than

the

of

the

capital

$1,200,000
projects

in
for

flood-control, parks and recreation, as spec if 1 erl

111

I 1,,, I Jr rl 1 11ci11cio lHlop I Pd

in 1975. [See specifically the trial court's Frnrlrnqs II

7,

8,

11, included herein as Appendix "8", and the RPrnrrl at
1746-1749.

'I,

1 IJ,

<rnd

1f>Cl1-1t,9') arid

See also Exhibit D-4.)

In February 1977---at Plaintiffs' request---the Plaintiffs' properly
was annexed into the City. In July 1977 the Plaintiffs pa id an "impact
fee" of $16,576 as a condition to develop a 30-acre, 96-single-famlly
dwelling unit residential subdivision, the "Wescall Subdivision", in the
City.
ARGUMENT
POI NT I

THE "REASONABLENESS" OF THE "IMPACT FEE" ASSESSED
IS THE ~LY ISSUE TO BE DECIDED
This

Court in Call I has already upheld the facial constitutionality

of the City's "impact fee" ordinance. 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). That
facial constitutionality was reaffirmed

in the Call II decision. 614 P.2d

1258 (Utah 1980). However, in Call II, the the case was remanded

for

trial to determine---at Plaintiffs' request---the sole issue of the "as
applied" constitutionality of the assessed

fee. Justice Wilkins, writing

for a unanimous court, wrote:
In this case the rule adopted by this Court in Call I,
quoted ante, cannot be applied without plaintiffs being given
the opportunity to present evidence to show that the dedication
required of them had no reasonable relationship to the needs for
flood control or parks and recreation facilities created by
their subdivision ••
614 P.2d at 1259. Emphasis added.
Notwithstanding the explicit rulings of this Court in both Call I and
Call II and the clear direction as to the limited issue reserved for trial
following remand, the Plaintiffs still are asserting that the "impact fee"
ordinance is "unconstitutional" on its face.
Certainly

the

doctrine

of "the

law of

the case"

prevents

a

re-examination of these issues. That "doctrine" st ates that once a case
has been adjudicated and appealed, the law as announced by the appellate
court [this Court) ought to be followed for all subsequent proceedings in

I

11<Jl

1 ;ic;P.

lhe rurpose of the doctrine has been articulated by this Court

in the case of Richardson vs Grand Central Corporation, 572 P.2d 395 (Utah
l'l77l, in li1ich the Court wrote:
The purpose of the doctrine of "the law of the case" is that
in the interest of economy of time and efficiency of procedure,
it is desirable to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in
repetitious contentions and rulings upon the same proposition in
the same case.
572 P.2d at 397. Emphasis added.
Certainly the Plaintiffs' continual claims of the invalidity of the
"impact fee" ordinance---when the constitutionality of the ordinance has
been already upheld TWICE by this Court in this case involving these SAME
PLAINTIFFS---are "repetitious contentions" which the doctrine seeks to
avoid. The decisions of this Court in Call I and Call II must be held to
be binding upon the Plaintiffs,

especially when they challenged, in a

declaratory judgment action, the validity of the "impact fee" ordinance
under a nlJTlber of theories. The Court has ruled that the ordinance was
valid and constitutional.

To

allow the Plaintiffs to re-litigate those

issues or to inject new issues (which should have been filed originally in
the declaratory judgment action in 1978) is patently wasteful of precious
judicial resources;

this

"Johnny come

lately"

approach cannot be

countenanced. Otherwise, there will be no end to this litigation.
The Plaintiffs rely heavily on this Court's decision in the case of
Banberry Development Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah
1981), decided after Call I and Call II were announced. This Court, in
Banberry, made it absolutely clear what the issues were to be in THIS
LITIGATION, when the Court wrote:
In Call v. City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979),
on rehearing 614 P.2d 1257 (1980), this Court upheld the
validity of a city ordinance that required subdividers, as a
condition of pl at approval, to dedicate certain proposed
subdivision land to the city • • . . In remanding the case for
trial on the constitutionality of the ordinance as applied
• • • , this Court ruled that "the dedication should have some
reasonable relationship to the need created by the
subdivision."
631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added.
The "reasonableness" of the "impact fee", "as applied" against the
present Plaintiffs, is the sole issue for determination in this case. The
Plaintiffs should not be allowed to re-litigate issues previously decided,
even if those issues are somewhat disguised to mask their true character.

7

On the "reasonableness"

issue,

the

f'l~lfllltts

opportunity to resent evidence" to show the impact
them

was

"unreasonable."

"opportunity." THE

The

November

18,

fpp

1982

wPrP

dSSP'i'iP<1

t nal

PLAINTIFFS PRESENTlD NO EVIDENL'l DN

Accordingly, the trial court,
dismissed Plaintiffs' claims,

"q1vpri

;,qa1nst

was
!Hf

tlw
that

l'>SlJf.

upon timely motion by the Defendant,
held that the Plaintiffs had failed to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence their claims, and held that "no
cause of action had been shown", and that judgment should be entered in
favor of the Defendant. [See the trial court's "Memorandum Decis10n"
(Appendix "A", herein) and the discussion at Point II, below.)
POI NT I I
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN TO SHOW
THAT THE IMPACT FEE WAS UNREASONABLE
As indicated above, the issue reserved for trial by the Supreme Court
was

the"reasonableness"

of

the

"impact

fee"

assessed against

the

Plaintiffs.
The Plaintiffs HAVE BEEN GIVEN the "opportunity to present evidence"
concerning the "unreasonableness" of the West Jordan
November 18, 1982 trial was that "opportunity."

"impact fee".

The

THE PLAINTIFFS PRESENTED

ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE to show that the fee was unreasonable. This lack of
evidence was predicted by Mr DeBry, counsel for the Plaintiffs, prior to
the beginning of the presentation of his evidence. He remarked:
Your Honor, our case this morning will be very short. It's the
only case in my career that I remember where the testimony will
be shorter than the opening statement.
Emphasis added. Record at p. 1716.
Plaintiffs'

only evidence

accountant, Mr. Sharkey.

presented was

the testimony of the

His twenty minutes of testimony [Record at

1720-1765.) can be summarized as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
I am a certified public accountant and I have examined the West
Jordan City records and exhibits previously admitted in this
case. The aforementioned examination took approximately 23
hours. I also heard the testimony of the City's witnesses at
the September 1st and 2nd evidentiary hearing. On the basis of
my examination of the records and the exhibits admitted into
evidence and the testimony of the City's witnesses from the
September 1st and 2nd hearing. I am unable to formulate an
opinion as to whether or not the monies collected pursuant to

8

t hP f loorl lont rol Impact Fee Ordinance of West Jordan from the
prr-,,ent f'laintifFs were expended for flood control and parks

purpnSP"3.

CROSS EXAMINATION
I found no evidence to show that any of the fees collected and
deposited into the "flood control" account of the general fund
were utilized for anything other than capital expenditures for
flood control and parks and recreation area projects. I found
no records indicating that expenditures were made for improper
purposes.
The City records, indicated that the fund balance in
the flood control account was zeroed out each year at the end of
the fiscal year.
The City records showed that the City
collected from developers approximately $525,000 pursuant to
the" impact fee" ordinance and deposited the same in the "flood
control" account; the City records showed that the City expended
from the flood control account within the general fund
approximately $1,200,000 for capital projects for flood control
and parks and recreation areas.
Mr.

Sharkey' s

testimony---at

least as the same can be utilized for

persuasive evidence for Plaintiffs' assertions--- can be summarized to a
single sentence:
I am unable to formulate an opinion.
The Plaintiffs have had the "opportunity to present evidence" to show
that there was "no reasonable relationship" between
paid and the needs their subdivision created.

the "impact fee"

The trial court was correct

in ruling that this evidence did not show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the West Jordan Ordinance was "unreasonable."
The trial court

complied with this

Court's directive (i.e. to give

the Plaintiffs an "opportunity to present evidence").
not produce one recreation expert to testify.

The Plaintiffs did

The Plaintiffs themselves

(Mr John Call and Mr Clark Jenkins)---allegedly so aggrieved by the
alleged unconstitutional application of the ordinance---did not testify!!
Mr. Sharkey, the accountant, openly acknowledge that he was not an expert
in these other disciplines and could give no testimony on those related
issues. Record at 1764.
The

Plaintiffs'

sole evidence is the testimony of Mr. Sharkey

concerning his inability to formulate an opinion. Had Plaintiffs truly
been interested in proving the "unreasonableness" of the "impact fee",
they

could

have

hired

an

engineer

"unreasonableness" of that "impact fee."

to

testify

concerning

the

This the Plaintiffs did not do.

In his opening statement prior

t

,J

t

lw i'r' .,,

,t ;t

1

DeBry acknowledged to the court:
Now, we still have the burden of µPr·..;ua'.:;trm. wP've ql1t

to

persuade the court. But what we have to •he t" pPrs,,;idc- I lip
court with is their evidence. We've s1mplv qot t<i look"' lliP1r
records and their documents and their minutes, ;inalvzr, t t1;il <rnd
use that material to persuade the courl. Then it brings u,3 down
to our witnesses today, your honor. Our evidence will be very
short. I have a certified public accountant who will take the
stand. He will testify that he looked at all of their evidence,
he has heard the evidence in the trial, he's looked at the
exhibits, and he cannot form any conclusions, that based on the
evidence they've given us, based on their own financial records,
he cannot answer the questions set out by the Banberry court.
Record at pp. 1719-1720. Emphasis added.
The Defendants rely significantly upon the Master's Report.

Yet the

Master's Report was only A PRELIMINARY REPORT .[The preparation of the
"final report" was expressly waived by the Plaintiffs. Record at 760.] In
that Master's Report the Master himself realized that he would have to DO
MORE THAN MERELY EXAMINE THE CITY'S ACCOUNTING RECORDS. Page 2 of the
Master's Report [Exhibit 25] contains the following statement:
Since the information is not provided in the accounting
records, it will have to come from other records and again from
the help of a trained engineer.
Emphasis added. It is interesting to wonder where Plaintiffs assumed that
the "accounting records" MUST show the "reasonableness" of the "impact
fee". Call I and Call II didn't say that; Benberry didn't say that. Even
the court-appointed Master---a certified public accountant,

not

a

lawyer---recognized that HE WOULD HAVE TO DO MORE THAN LOOK AT THE CITY'S
ACCOUNTING

RECORDS

to

determine

if

the

fee

was

"reasonable"

or

"unreasonable."
Yet the Plaintiffs' approach still continues to be "that it must be
shown in the accounting records that the fee is 'reasonable' or else the
City loses". [See the discussion at

C, below.] The accounting records of

the City reflect only monetary items; the do not reflect subjective issues
such as the "benefits conferred" to a particular subdivis10n. To determine
those

"benefits

conferred",

one

must---as

the

Master

clearly

indicated---consult with a trained engineer. THIS [HE PLAINTIFFS 010 NOT
DOI

10

''I 11"' 1 I ts pr1itJ,wp1J hut nrlP witness, Mr. Sharkey, who indicated:
1.

t hP

lli;Jt

1·1ci'.31

Mast er was correct

in his analysis in that the

Pr would he required to talk to engineers. [Record at 1756]

Thal he had talkPr1 Io the city engineer "for about ten
minutes". [Record at 1757]
3.

That he has never observed the Wescall Subdivision. [Record

at 1763]
4.

That he had no particular expertise concerning the needs

created by the residents who live in the subdivision, those
needs being parks and recreation facilities. [Record at 1764]

5. That

he had no way of disputing the engineers testimony and

analysis concerning run-off created by that subdivision. [Record

at 1764]
6. That he had no technical expertise to know what kind of flood
control problems the subdivision might create. [Record at 1764]
7.

That

he had taken much less time to inspect the City's

records than was actually necessary.
This last point was correctly keyed upon by Judge Dee, who remarked:
THE COURT: I understand that in Mr. Sharkey's affidavit
that it would take 50 to 100 hours and he didn't spend that
time, he spent 8 hours.
Record at 1755.
Obviously the trial court judge was unconvinced by the inadequate
preparation the Plaintiffs had arranged. The Plaintiffs had failed to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the fee assessed against them was
"unreasonable".

The lack of evidence furnished by the Plaintiffs cannot

contradict

the

evidence

concerning

the

needs

Plaintiffs'

counsel

presented

created

by

in

the

the

September

Wescall

1982

development.

hearings
Indeed,

in his opening remarks admitted that he had no

evidence on these issues. [Record at

1717-1718]

The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant had failed to comply with
the pre-trial order of Judge Rigtrup.
(Judge Dee)

specifically found

pre-trial order of Judge Rigtrup.

that

On the contrary, the trial judge
the City had complied with the

Judge Dee stated:

. I have already ruled on the question whether I
thought he's complied with Judge Rigtrup's order, and I think he
has,

RPcnrd at 1711-1712. Emphasis added.

11

However, the Plaintiffs ignore the bur1JPns pl3c1'd IJPllN THlM hv the
pre-trial order.

The pre-trial order (Paragraph 6' spPr1ficollv prllvided:

. • • the Plaintiffs shall have the burden of proof with rPspect
to each matter listed below:
A. Whether the 7% fee required of Plaintiffs had ;my
reasonable relationship to the needs for flood
control, parks and recreation facilities created by
their sttidivision. (Citation to cases omitted)
B. Whether the 7% fee has required the newly
developed properties to bear more than there equitable
share of capital cost in relation to the benefits
conferred. (Citation to Benberry case omitted.) .
Chviously, the Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the pre-trial
order which recited the obligations which had been imposed upon the
Plaintiffs by Call II and Benberry.
All the Plaintiffs presented was testimony concerning the lack of
documentation within the City records.

Mr. Sharkey was unable to express

an opinion concerning whether or not the City spent the money for the
projects indicated.

Certainly, the inability to express an opinion does

not prove by a preponderance of evidence that the "impact fee" was not
spent in the manner the City had claimed.

Indeed, by Mr. Sharkey's own

admission, the City took in approximately $525,000 from developers as
monies pursuant to the "impact fee" ordinance.

During that same ti me the

City expended almost $1,200,000 for flood control and parks projects.

Mr.

Sharkey admitted that the City's practice was to zero out the account at
the end of each year.

[See

Finding No. 10].

Mr. Sharkey testified that

he uncovered no evidence to show that any expenditures from the "flood
control

account"

were

made

for

anything

other

than

the

capital

improvements for parks and recreation projects represented by the numerous
exhibits.

Finding No. 11]

Certainly the inability to express an opinion would perhaps be
critical if the City had spent LESS on such projects than it took in from
developers.

But that is not the case here; the City spent MORE---hundreds

or thousands of dollars more---than it took in.
up

by

a "subsidy"

[Finding No. 9].

from

other

general

This difference was made

revenue

sources

of the

City.

Indeed, the development impact fee assessed against the

developers, including the Plaintiffs, simply WAS

NOT SUFFICIENT TO

ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE NEEDS CREATED BY THE DEVELOPMENT. [Record at 161 3]
This,

however,

does not show that the fee was "unreasonable".

If

anything, it shows that the fee was "more than reason ab 1 e" and that the
12

'1Pv•

0

than

lopPr'o wPrce being subsidized.
111P

In actuality they were paying for

true impact they were creating.

less

Certainly the showing made by

the Plaintiffs was properly understood.
The City's response was and has always been that it was pooled with
other monies so as to provide these flood control and parks and recreation
projects. This pooling has certainly been allowed.

In specific response,

the City purchased the Booth property immediately adjacent to the Wescall
Subdivision. The purchase of the "Booth Property" was made expressly
because of the development of the Wescall subdivision and one other
residential subdivision. See Exhibit 13-D.

Testimony was given by Mr.

Olson that the Wescall residents would require 1.45 acres of additional
park area. [Record at 1700] The cost for this real estate so purchase at
$9,000 per acre would be in excess of $13,000.

This expenditure was made

concerning the Booth property in anticipation of the Wescall Subdivision
being approved the following month.
1697, 1700] The $13,000 figure

[Record at 1556-1558, 1681, 1684,

DOES NOT

include the capital expenditures

for the park which may run thousands of dollars more, nor does it include
any fee concerning the flood-control costs incurred by the Wescall
development.
Witnesses testified concerning that the Wescall development would
increase the run-off into Bingham

Creek

by 17 cubic feet of water per

second for every second of duration of the storm. [Record at 1734]
Certainly the Plaintiffs should

be expected to pay for the increased

run-off created by their development' The Plaintiffs presented no evidence
even to attack, let alone rebut, the Defendant's evidence presented on
that point.

Indeed, Mr. Sharkey admitted that he had no evidence

concerning that item.

[Record at 1764]

De fend ant' s witnesses testified that immediately "downstream" (i.e.
downhill from the Bingham Creek channel, into which the run-off from the
Wescall Subdivision was discharged) was a residential subdivision which
was frequently flooded. [Record at 1598-1601] The trial court properly
Found that Plaintiffs should be held to pay for part of the "impact" (i.e.
increased run-off which may flood the "downstream" subdivision) the
Plaintiffs' development created. [Findings Nos. 16 and 17]
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The Plaintiffs have incorrectly analyzed tl1e burdPn placed upor1 them
by the Call II decision.

The Plaintiffs did not utilize taking "the

opportunity to present evidence"

that

the

fee "bore no reasonable

relationship to the needs created by their subdivision."
Plaintiffs claim the burden is upon the Defendant.

Rather, the

This improper approach

can be readily determined by reading the headings for argument
Plaintiffs' brief, as

in

discussed in subparagraph C, below.

This approach (that the "burden is upon the City") totally ignores
the clear directive of

Call II:

the case was remanded so that PLAINTIFFS

SHOW the "impact fee" was "unreasonable".

COULD

The approach further

ignores the clear language from Banberry:
Once [the municipality has disclosed the basis of its
calculations to whoever challenges the reasonableness of its
subdivision fees], the burden of showing failure to comply with
the constitutional standard of reasonableness in this matter is
on the challengers.
631 P.2d at 904.

Emphasis added. Bracketed material added for clarity.

The "basis" for the City's "impact fee" could have been disclosed to
Plaintiffs when they paid the impact fee in July 1977; because neither of
the Plaintiffs testified we do not know i f this was done.

In any event,

during the course of the litigation, that basis has been disclosed to the
Plaintiffs. See Defendant's responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories,
dated January 7, 1982. [Record at 780] In any event, the "basis" was fully
disclosed to the Plaintiffs at the September 1982 hearings before the
Court.

Not only was the "basis" presented, under oath, but Plaintiffs had

an opportunity to cross-examine that evidence'!

c
A brief response should be made to Plaintiffs' unsubstantiated (and
legally incorrect) claims:

POINT I. WEST JORDAN HAD THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE. West
Jordan did disclose the "basis" of the "impact

fee"

ordinance.

It

disclosed to the Plaintiffs its accounting records, both in response to
14

pre-trial discovery and during the September 1982 hearing.

The "impact

fee" proceeds were deposited into a "segregated" account:

the "flood

control" account.

The trial judge ruled that the Defendant had met its

burden under the case law AND Judge Rigtrup's pre-trial order.

POINT II:

WEST JORDAN MUST LOSE IF IT FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF

PRODUCING EVIDENCE.

As noted, this is an incorrect analysis out ignore

the fact that the TRIAL COURT RULED the Defendant HAD METS ITS BURDEN.
Plaintiffs'
follows:

argument is summarized, in Plaintiffs' brief [p.8], as

Thus, in this case, the order of proof is as follows:
A. West Jordan has the burden to come forward with
the evidence of why and how and where the seven
percent was spent.
B. Plaintiff has the burden of persuasion to show
that such expenditures are unreasonable.
However, if the defendant does not satisfy its burden with
respect to A, we never will get to step B.
The problem with this argument is that DEFENDANT DID SATISFY THIS
BURDEN.

The trial court so ruled.

"why" the fee was exacted

The Defendant did explain the reason

and "where" the monies were spent.

[See

Exhibit 4-D, which summarized several hundred pages of billings and checks
(Exhibit D-24)---which had been submitted to the Plaintiffs (July 1982)
pursuant to their discovery request---showing the disbursements made from
the" flood control" account.] It is incredible that Plaintiffs continually
ignore this evidence!
Those exhibits and discovery documents disclose every penny spent for
capital projects from the "flood control" account.

Not only do they

disclose where "impact fees" were expended, but they also represent the
expenditures of hundreds of thousands of dollars of "subsidy" because the
7% impact fee was not enough.
POINT III:

WEST JORDAN HAS FAILED TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT A PUBLIC

HEARING WAS HELD AND THAT THE PLANNING COMMISSION PREPARED THE ORDINANCE.
This point is more fully discussed at Point III, below.

It should suffice

to note that the trial court found that there was such a public hearing
held and that the ordinance was properly prepared.
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See Finding No. 22.

Additionally, the court found:
The Plaintiffs submitted no evidence to '>t1uw 1 h81 a ri•ihl ir
hearing was not held or that the Planning & Zon1nq lomrn1ss1on
did not prepare the Ordinance.
Finding No. 22.
POINT IV:

WEST JORDAN HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE

SEVEN PERCENT FEE IS A RESTRICTED FUND. Monies collected pursuant to the
"impact fee" ordinance WERE PLACED INTO A RESTRICTED FUND: the "flood
control" account of the general fund.

On this point, the Court must be

cognizant that the particular accounting "label" is not significant;
rather, the concept is important.
so collected?

Yes.

Did the City account for those monies

The aforementioned documents attest the appropriate

accounting controls were present.

The evidence showed no expenditures

were made, except for the specified purposes:

flood control and parks.

Mr. Sharkey "retreated" from his testimony that the money may have been
used for an improper purpose (i.e. "on the Mayor's car"---quoted on P. 16
of Plaintiffs' brief).

[Record at

1749, line 7.] Certainly, if such an

expenditure (for the Mayor's car or any other illegitimate purpose) had
been made, it would have been
exhibit.

paraded by the Plaintiffs as their prime

Not one of the checks, etc., contained within Exhibit D-24 shows

any such improper expenditure.
POINT V:

WEST JORDAN HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT A

FLAT SEVEN PERCENT FEE IS APPROPRIATE FOR ALL SUBDIVISIONS.
burden is not on the City to make such a showing.

Again, the

Indeed, if such a

showing (that the uniform impact fee was appropriate for

ALL subdivisions

in the city) were required, the trial would have lasted one hundred days!!
Rather, as noted above, the issues at trial
Plaintiffs' subdivision.

were to be limited to

Further, that Plaintiffs had the burden of

showing the "unreasonableness" of the fee.

Again , Plaint i ff s are

injecting new issues. This litigation will never finish if such an
approach is countenanced.
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POINT VI:
SEVEN

DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN TO SHOW THAT THE

PERCENT

FEE

FUTURE-COMERS.

FALLS

EQUALLY

ON

OLD-TIMERS,

NEW-COMERS,

AND

Again, Banberry clearly placed this burden upon the

Plaintiffs, as "challengers."

The Plaintiffs presented NO EVIDENCE on

this point and accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed.
Also, the specific nature of this case is factually significant from
Banberry.

In this case the "impact fee" was assessed only because of the

"needs created" for parks and flood-control.
quantified.

The expenditures have been made.

These "needs" have been
The capital improvements

for parks and flood control are much easier to isolate than the capital
improvements necessary for a new sewage treatment facility made necessary
by the new development.
The Wescall "impact fee" was a one-time payment, used to off-set the
impact upon parks and flood-control. There are no "on going" charges (such
as sewer service fee) to take into account. Similarly, the "impact fee"
WAS NOT USED BY THE CITY AS A GENERAL REVENUE MEASURE. Nor was the basis
of the fee and the purposes for its use "retroactively" established by the
City Council. Contrast Lafferty vs Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982).
The "purposes" for the "impact fee" were set by the ordinance at its
adoption in 1975: flood-control and parks and recreation areas. The
evidence showed no variance from those purposes.
In any event, the burden is upon the challengers.
POINT VII:
CONTROL AND PARKS.

THIS CASE HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE NEED FOR FLOOD
At this point, after Plaintiffs have flip-flopped back

and forth on the issues, one wonders what this case does deal with.
As a minimum, the Plaintiffs analysis is incorrect.

The existence of

"other methods" available to finance these projects is immaterial to the
issues involved.

Call I, Call II, and Banberry all affirm the principle

that an "impact fee" CAN BE ASSESSED against developers to pay for the
needs created by that development.
Plaintiffs imply that the City should have financed these projects
through "bonding" or other methods.

To have done so would merely shifted

the burden created by the "few" to be borne by the "many".
patently unfair to the "many":

That is

those "old" residents should not be

required to pay, even in part, for the additional "needs" created by the
"new" development, especially when the developers have profited by the
development creating those needs.
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POI NT I I I
COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs, at page 10 of their brief, assert that "C'anned" f1nchr1qs
were prepared by West Jordan and were:
• • • mechanically signed by Judge Dee some months after
hearing the evidence. That practice has been criticized.
Emphasis added.
Such could not be further from the truth.
"mechanically signed" by the trial judge.

The findings WERE NOT

They were signed only AFTER the

Plaintiffs had submitted to the court seven pages of objections to the
proposed findings [Record at 1251-1256A] and oral argument had been heard
on March 14th.

Thereafter, the Plaintiffs submitted an additional 204

pages of supporting documentation (cases, argumentative briefs and
exhibits, court orders, etc. [See Mr. DeBry's letter to Judge Dee, dated
March 29, 1983. Record at 1260-1491]
On April 22, 1983, Judge Dee, certainly being apprised of all
relevant issues and after he had had ample opportunity to inspect the
additional information furnished by the Plaintiffs, signed the Findings.
Certainly, the signing of the Findings cannot be characterized as being
"mechanically signed".
The fact that the signing occurred "some months after hearing the
evidence," is totally of the Plaintiffs' making. First, the order of trial
was reversed by Judge Rigtrup because Plaintiffs claimed they could not
understand the discovery documents furnished to them. [Mr Sharkey later
admitted that prior to the August 6, 1982 hearing before Judge Rigtrup he
made only a "cursory examination" of the discovery materials (Exhibit
D-24) furnished to Plaintiffs the month earlier. Record at 1736.]

Judge

Rigtrup required the City to present evidence on limited issues. The City"
went first" on these limited issues. Then, at the November 18, 1982
hearing---scheduled more than two months earlier---so Plaintiffs would
have

time

to

inspect

the

documents

and

investigate

the

sworn

testimony---the Plaintiffs presented their case. Closing arguments were in
the form of a written brief by Plaintiff's counsel. The Court took the
matter under advisement and allowed Defendant's counsel time to prepare a
responsive brief. On December 22, 1982 the trial court rendered its
"Memorandum Decision" [Appendix "A"] . Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
18
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IHPpared by the prevailing party---as expressly directed by the

werP

I rial

rourt---and

forwarded

to the court and opposing counsel in

rntd-Jariuary 1983. In late-January 1983, Plaintiffs' counsel submitted his
"ubjections" to the proposed Findings and scheduled oral argument on those
"objections" for March 14, 1983. After the argument, Plaintiffs' counsel
submitted the 200+ pages of briefs, etc., to the Court as supportive
documentation. The Findings were not signed by the trial judge until April
21' 1983.
Regardless of when the Findings were signed is the fact that the
trial judge---ostensibly when the evidence was "fresh" in his memory and
without

any

improper suggestion

from

zealous counsel---ruled THAT

PLAINTIFFS HAD FAILED TO PROVE THEIR CLAIMS BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE. See the trial court's "Memorandum Decision", Appendix "A".
Plaintiffs assert that there was no evidence to support the court's
findings.

This is incorrect.

The following table indicates the pages of

the Record of testimony presented to the trial court supporting these
specific findings.
FINDING NO.
1

2

3
4

5

6
7
8
9

10

11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
ZS
26
27

PAGE OF RECORD WHERE TESTIMONY ON ISSUE WAS PRESENTED
Not in Dispute
1565-1570, 1572, 1581-1582, 1622
1541, 1552
1617
Not in Dispute
1696' 1703-1704
1688-1689, 1691
1763, 1676, 1678-1680, 1694-1695
1747
1744-1745, 1762
1745-1746, 1748-1750, 1687, 1592, 1594, 1598,
1614
1616-1619, 1624, 1626, 1630, 1634, 1700
1581-1582, 1623
1582-1583, 1594, 1622-1623
1584, 1632
1593-1594, 1598, 1616, 1619, 1624, 1636
1598-1601, 1619-1622
1617' 1700
1699
1700
1556-1558, 1681, 1684, 1697' 1700
1542-1543, 1548, 1551-1553, 1555, 1559-1560, 1642,
1644, 1646-1649, 1653, 1655-1659, 1661, 1672,
1673
1537-1538, 1548, 1576
1731-1733, 1736, 1740, 1742
1745-1746, 1748-1750
441, 760, 1752
1606, 1612-1613, 1617, 1620, 1636
19

28
29

161 3' 161 7' 16 20
1613, 1617, 1620, 1636, 17hl

The Findings and Judgment of the trial court arP
presumption of correctness. The appellant must sust

a111

showing error. The Supreme Court should review the record

P11l

1t

ID

a

ttie t11irr1Pn

uf

in

a

!Pr1

!1ghl

most

favorable to the findings of the trial Judge and should not to disturb
them if lhe Supreme Court finds substantial support in the evidence.
Kohler vs Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981);

Piacitelli vs Southern

Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981);

Litho Sales Inc. vs

Cutrubus, 636 P.2d 487 (Utah 1981); Score vs Wilson, 611 P.2d 367 (Utah
1982); Highland Construction Co. vs Stephenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981);
Knight vs Leigh, 619 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980); and Search vs Union Pacific R.
Co., 649 P.2d 48 (Utah 1982).
The trial court's findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless
they are clearly against the weight of the evidence.

Ute-Cal. Land

Development vs Intermountain Stock Exchange, 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981).
It is not the Supreme Court's prerogative to determine whether the
evidence

preponderated

on

one

side

responsibility of the trier of fact.

or

the

other;

that

is

the

Reimchiissel vs Russell, 649 P.2d 26

(Utah 1982).
The Supreme Court should not substitute its view of the evidence for
that of the District Court.
(Utah 1980);

Nielsen vs Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512

Fisher vs Taylor, 572 P.2d 393 (Utah 1977); Hidden Meadows

Dev. Co. vs Mills, 690 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1978); Bustanente vs Bustamente,
645 P.2d 40 (Utah 1982).
On review, the Supreme Court will accord considerable deference to
the judgment of the trial court due to its advantaged position and will
not disturb action of that court unless the evidence clearly preponderates
to the contrary or the trial court abuses its discretion.

Openshaw vs

Openshaw, 639 P.2d 177 (Utah 1981); Christensen vs Christensen, 628 P.2d
1297 (Utah 1981).
The foregoing cases clearly and unequivocabl y indicate that this
court should defer to Judge Dee's Findings.

The Plaint 1 ffs' blanket

assertions that there was no evidence, are incorrect.

As shown

111

the

table above, there was considerable evidence to support the trial court
findings.
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lh1s ex1sterice of evidence must be contrasted with the

Pl,11nt dfs' evidence
admitted

he

was

in

the form of testimony by Mr. Sharkey who openly

"unable

expen1j1ture of the funds.

to

formulate

an

opinion"

concerning

the

This lack of evidence cannot be considered to

outweigh the overwhelming preponderance of evidence which showed that the
subdivision did create needs and that the monies collected pursuant to the
Impact Fee Ordinance was expended in the furtherance of those needs.
The findings and judgment of the trial court, in its advantaged
position to fully

weigh and savor the evidence, should not be disturbed.

Those findings and judgment should be upheld by the Supreme Court.
Plaintiffs claim [p. B of their Brief] that the Planning & Zoning
Commission did not prepare the ordinance and there was no public hearing
held prior to the preparation of the "impact fee" ordinance.
is incorrect.

Again, this

There was evidence on this point.

Ronald Olson, the West Jordan City Recorder, testified concerning the
preparation of the ordinance.

The Planning & Zoning Commission had an

informal policy of requiring the voluntary deduction of "green areas" by
subdividers. The "minutes" of the April 17, 1974 meeting of the Planning &
Zoning Commission [which were read into the Record at pp. 1672-1673]
re fleet the foll owing entry:
Mr. Buchanan has researched the deduction of property from
a subdivision for public use, and there is no legal basis for
this. We can only recommend and suggest that this be given but
the developer can reject it. He, also, mentioned that the City
Attorney should work on the wording so that it can be used for
the general public and not just one subdivision • • •
Emphasis added.
Glen Moosman, a former city councilman, testified concerning the
genesis of the "impact fee" ordinance:
There was a public hearing for the consideration of the Master
Plan of the City of West Jordan and the ordinances and various
concepts, and it was held in the West Jordan Junior High.
Emphasis added.

Record at 1656.

Mr. Moosman further testified that the meeting was publicized through
flyers and that the meeting was held in the school auditorium---not the
normal meeting place for the West Jordan City Council---to accommodate the
large number of persons in attendance.
attendance. Record at 1657.

Even some developers were in

Moosman indicated that:

"these concepts of flood control and reservation of land for
parks and recreation issues [were] discussed at that meeting."

Record at 1659.
Mr. Moosman further testified that there was a quPsl1on from the
audience---a Mrs. Schmidt---concerning flood control. Moosman test1f1ed:
He [Mr. Buchanan, the City Planner] then explainPd that
each developer must take care of his own flood water that
originates on his property.
They have suggested catch basins
that can be used both for flood control and recreational use.
Record at 1661. Bracketed material added for clarity.
Moosman then quoted the City Council minutes for that August 1974
public hearing:
Good examples of this type of use is the football field at
East High and the Sugarhouse Park.
Record at 1661 •
Mr.

Nick Colessides,

the

then City Attorney for West Jordan,

testified concerning the preparation of the "impact fee" ordinance:
The Planning Commission--any ordinance relating to matters
pertaining to planning and zoning would have to have been passed
by the Planning Commission prior to its arrival to the City
Council for final passage and posting. In this particular
instance, again from memory, when the ordinance was first
drafted it would have been sent to Planning & Zoning for their
review as well, and after whatever recommendations they would
have made it would have come up with the City Council where it
would have been discussed again. And if further revision was
necessary, further revision would be made, and finally passed by
the City Council.
Record at 1644. Emphasis added.
Certainly the "time frane" under which the "impact fee" ordinance was
adopted is

consistent:

from April 1974 (when the City Attorney was

directed Planning Commission "to work on the wording") to August 1974
(when the public hearing was held in the junior high schoo 1) to January
1975 (when the ordinance was finally adopted). The "impact fee" ordinance
was not just the product of hastily perceived need, but rather the
well-founded, properly publicized and fully-explained plan to solve a
pressing "public welfare" issue within the local community.
In any event the Plaintiffs presented absolutely NO EVIDENCE to show
the public hearing was not held or that the "impact fee" ordinance was
"prepared" by the Planning & Zoning Commission.

The trial court's

"Findings" indicate:
The Plaintiffs submitted no evidence to show that a public
hearing was not held or that the Planning and Zoning Commission
did not prepare the Ordinance.
Findings No. 22.
22

POINT IV
THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT BE CERTIFIED AS A CLASS ACTION
When this '3ction was filed in 1978, it was designated as a "class
action." In April 1978 Judge David K. Winder, then a state judge, ruled
that the action should not be certified. His decision (regarding the
non-certification) was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court [even though the
Plaintiffs' counsel later represented to Judge Banks that the issue HAD
NOT been appealed; see Record at 420]. In

Call I and

Call II, the Court

did not discuss the issue with the use of the terms "class action", the
Court did

rule on the general issue: namely, that a "class action

certification" was not appropriate.
In the summer of 1981---following remand to the district court---the
Plaintiffs renewed their motion for "class action certification". That
motion was heard by Judge Jay E. Banks, who denied the motion for class
action certification. Plaintiffs thereupon filed an "interlocutory appeal"
to this Court. [Docket No. 18098] This Court denied, without opinion, the
interlocutory appeal. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed in this Court an
original proceeding seeking a writ of mandamus

against Judge Banks,

requiring him to enter formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
to why he had denied the certification of the "class action." [Docket
No.18217] The City---as real-party-in-interest---responded. The Court,
without written opinion, denied to issue the writ of mandamus.
On September 1, 1982---the first day of trial---Plaintiffs again
renewed their motion for class action "certification". The Motion was
heard by Judge Dee, who took the matter under advisement---after receiving
Plaintiffs'

lengthy Memorandum of Law in support of the Motion. In

December 1982 Judge Dee ruled that the action should not be "certified."
[See the trial court's "Memorandum Decision", Appendix "A", herein.] Judge
Dee also made extensive findings as to WHY A CLASS ACTION IS INAPPLICABLE
FOR THIS CASE. See Findings 30-33.
A

THIS LITIGATION IS NOT "CLASS ACTION" MATERIAL
The Plaintiffs have been able to assemble---from the literally
tlmusands of cases discussing "class actions"---and quote some authorities
as to why this action should be a class action. They simply overlook the
simple facts as to why it should not be a class action.
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plaintiffs and they certainlv ar<>n't a rPpresentat1ve ··ruc,s spct1on.
Secondly, we do not have a situation ...tiere a number of lawsuits has
been flied on the same issue (here it would be the const ltut1onalltv of
the ordinance'.

In that situation, the class action becomes a method of

consolidating the tnals---and preventing future trials, because all the
class members can be bound by the one judgment.
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LAWSUIT.

Here, we have onlv the

The other sixty-nine developers DO '<OT SEEM TO CARE---and

that's even after the casP attracted widespread attention.

Cert1Ficat10n

will not consolidate any trials, because there are none.

It wll l not

prevent future trials, because there will be none.
Further, certification does not prevent "1ncons1stent" conduct on the
part of the City v1s-a-v1s the class members.

It

likewise wll l not

prevent such "inconsistent" adjud1cat1ons, because there will be no other
claims to ad.Judicate.

And there are likely to be none.

This is confirmed

by the fact that the fee has been assessed since 1975 and with today's
financial

market what

it is, no developer---have paid the fee "under

protest"---1s going to sit around for five or six years to bring suit to
get it back, if he thought he had a legal claim.]
THE FACIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY C£ THE ORDINANCE WAS UPHELD BY
SUPREME COURT.
b BS

l S.

The Court

THE UTAH

remanded the case for trial on an "as applied"

Such individualized ; "as applied"'

issues are not

the proper

subject of "class act 10n 11 t 1qat ion."

Pla1nt1ffs'

continued rnnt1on

r,1r

"class cert1f1c1t1 1Jn 11

,

tht> '.:;ame has

""°'1Pn

been expressly denied on three OCL''-3Slons b\ three cJPpar11tP tr13l Ji.Jrit)P':; rir1(j
Implicitly denlt>d b' the Utah Suprt>me ~ourt, has lonq "''C"' :1orie b>"\•J••I the
realm of zealous advocacy. The namPd Pla1nt1ffs ~rP 'lot '1df1lP -1 lf', 0~11, ',.,i,11, b\
1

the denial of class act 10n cert1f1cat1on. fln t:1p othPr hand,
contention" of Pla1nt1ffs' counsel---s11[p obJert Jf r"l'tl1cr--1 L-;
party-l1tiqants, so as to perhaps justir, 'l tnq,wr ~ttJr•1p,'5
in my op1n1on, on unethical profes--:;1c1n3l

c 11 ent s and st 1 r r rnq uri 11 t 1ri at ton.

'-' 1JnC~LJC~:

l 'llJ

r:;

P·' '."'

"r~Det

">e

'.,1'1r:'''l
t-~

0

'

tl

1n

io1J'i

n11rP

---bur1Jt-':,.

~, ' , 1 - Lt --J

If"\

j

f

The> monev was
' '· ,.
r rr
r1t-•t-'11

, , ,~ ,
f,-.,1

dP\P\nJ1'-,r

l ~ 1 f'

!11~·

to

I

•-; P

1

r1 (

l 1f

1•

~~c1l1t1es.

how "his"

3f~P

r••.1 u l
w ..

Den °

r1 t

;rn rJ

t •J

l

fl o o d con t r o l

ns t a 1 l

liPneF1t the slild1v1sion creating the

J!.J

is fundamental

for each

flood control moneys were spent.

Iri such a case it

In this

ser1sP, Par·h StJbr11v1sirrn woulrl "stand alone" 1although

a limited way,

in

snme> suh<11v1sio11s mav hP interconnected to the same detention basin, as
was discussed above

in its flood control needs and solution.

1

l>tiether the

City spent the Fee so collected in a manner "demonstrably benefitting"
subdivision

"A"

has

no bearing on whether the City spent

the money

collected Fran slildivision "Z". Certification as a "class action" does not
cnake the resolution of this issue easier; rather, certification makes it
more

complex.

Certification

blurs,

by

lumping

distinctions the Supreme Court felt dispositive.

into

one

pot,

the

The Supreme Court has

already decided the Fundamental concept behind the 7% fee. By llJllping each
of the 70 or so subdivisions into a single category (via the "class
action" certification" and adjudicating the issue does not make any sense.
The "as applied"

issue cannot be adjudicated on that basis.

It requires

individualized consideration.
Separating the class members into subclasses (as proposed by the
Plaintiffs) is similarly unsuitable.
for each member.

There would have to be one subclass

It simply does not make sense to llJllp everyone together,

adjudicate the general issue [WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY DECIDED]
on a group basis---via the "general

fund" issue Plaintiffs raise---and

then break everyone out into an "individualized subclass (of one member
each'" to adjudicate the "as applied" issue concerning "demonstrable
benefit."

Logic

approaching

and

common

sense

dictate

that

such

a manner

of

and handling litigation is wasteful.

If anything, class

actions are supposed to be efficient, not wasteful of

time and resources.

The fact

that

the money collected pursuant to the Ordinance was

t1Ppos1ter1 into the "general fund" does not, as Plaintiffs suggest, mandate
"class act ion" handling of this matter.

Prior to the Call I, the iaw

'statutorv and the regulations issued thereunder by the Office
StdlP ~udllir'

of the

required municipalities to deposit such moneys into the

"r1Pr1er3l Fund"; hav1nq a separate "fund" was not allowed.

Thus, the City

Just because the moneys were co-mingled
w1t~,

•pp,

r~"1m

nthF"r

developers does not
2S

render

the

issue

a "class

action." Rather, the issue is whether or rrnt

lhP rnrllwy

"~"

tn a

·opPnt

manner which would "demonstrably benefit" the subdiv1s1on which created
the need for the facilities.
B

THE CITY POSSESSES "INDIVIDUALIZED" DEFENSfS
AGAINST THE CLASS MEMBERS
Under Rule 23 specific criteria must be present before a class action
can be maintained.

Plaintiffs have failed to show a number of essential

elements. One of these is that there are "individualized" defenses which
the City can assert.
Obviously,

the

"as

applied"

nature

of

the

issues

raises

individualized defenses. How the money from one developer is spent has no
effect on how the money from another developer is spent. One developer may
have a valid claim: the "impact fee" collected from him may be totally
"unreasonable," because his development may have created no needs. On the
other hand, that invalidity has no bearing as to the "impact fee" assessed
against another developer WHO DID CREATE THE NEEDS.
The City's second

defense is that each of the unnamed class members

did not file a "notice of claim" with the City, as required by Sections
63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated. Because such notices have not been filed

within the statutory time period, the claims are "forever barred."

Thus,

the City has an absolute defense against the claims of such members.
Certification would then require a division of the plaintiffs into two
subclasses: those who had filed the statutorily-required "notice" [here
only the named Plaintiffs] and those who had not filed the "notice."

When

the subclasses are so structured, it is obvious that John Call and Clark
Jenkins cannot represent those unnamed members who belong to the other
subclass.

First, their interests are dissimilar.

[This situation

adequately indicates the problem in having a "class action" prosecuted by
a single plaintiff:

when it gets down to the nitty-gritty issues

involved, that sole plaintiff cannot represent everyone, especially when
he does not constitute a "cross section" of the potenttal plaintiffs.

It

doesn't make any difference here that there are two named plaintiffs; both
of the name plaintiffs were partners developing a single subdivision at
issue.]
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c
!HE NAMED PLAINTIFFS DO NOT ADEQUATELY REPRESENT THE INTERESTS
OF THE UNNAMED CLASS MEMBERS
8y

their past conduct in this litigation, Plaintiffs have evidenced a

lack of concern towards the interests and rights of the unnamed class
members.

As an example of such disregard, I point out that on September

1, 1982---the first day of trial---again they moved the court for class
certification.

Anybody who brings a "class action" and then waits the day

of trial to notify the unnamed class members (whose rights he seeks to
represent and bind) cannot be said to "adequately represent" their
interests, as required by the Rule.

The Plaintiffs claim that "notice" to

the putative class members is not required for this "spurious" class
action.

If they (the class members) do not need to be notified of the

action, then why do they have to be NOW included?
D

CERTIFICATION AS A "CLASS ACTION" IS
IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE WRITTEN
DIRECTIONS CF FORMER DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
In Call II this Court noted:
In this case the rule adopted by this Court in Call I,
quoted ante, cannot be applied without plaintiffs being given
the opportunity to present evidence to show that the dedication
required of them had no reasonable relationship to the needs for
flood control or parks and recreation facilities created by
their subdivision, i f any.
Implicit in this rule is the
requirement that if the subdivision generates such needs and
West Jordan exacts the fee in lieu of dedication, it is only
fair that the fee so collected be used in a way as to benefit
demonstrably the subdivision in question. This is not to say
that the benefit must be solely [emphasis in original text] to
the particular subdivis~ut only that there be some
demonstrable benefit to it.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
614 P.2d at 1259. (Except where noted, all emphasis added.)
It is obvious that this Court---presented with the "class action"
issue on appeal---decided that a class action was not the method for
trial.

Rather, the Court mandated the issues to be those of "reasonable

. . created by their subdivision."
relationship . . . to the needs
Subdivisions throughout the City were not to be
(Emphasis added.)
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included.
litigated.

ONLY this ONE SUBDIVISION---and its tmpcicl afld
The City's obligation was to usP the

demonstrably benefit the subdivision in question."

fee

tn

f~e'---liPr>e

"tfl a

way

as

iiP

to

The C111Jrl could ""'

have been more clear on the issue.
Obviously, certification as a "class action" violates the Court's
directive that further proceedings "not inconsistent with this opinion" be
held.
In Banberry the

Court stated:

In Call v. City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979),
opinion on rehearing, 614 P.2d 1257 (1980), this court upheld
the validity of a city ordinance that required subdividers, as a
condition of plat approval, to dedicate certain proposed
subdivision land to the city (or pay cash in lieu) for flood
control and/or park or recreation facilities. In remanding the
case for trial on the constitutionality of the ordinance as
applied (i.e., the requirement that the seven percent of the
subdivision land be dedicated), this Court ruled that "the
dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the need
created by the subdivision." Id. at 1258.
Under the reasonableness test in Call v. City of West
jordan, supra, the benefits derived from the exaction need not
accrue solely to the subdivision (614 P.2d at 1259); flood
control and recreation are needs that cannot be treated in
isolation from the rest of the municipality. At the Salle time,
the benefits derived from the exaction must be of "demonstrable
benefit" to the subdivision. (Id. at 1259).
531 P.2d 905 (Emphasis added.)
The language quoted above could more clearly indicate the Court's
feeling on the "individualized nature" of the issues to be tried.

It does

violence to that simple language to even consider approaching these issues
on a "class action" basis.

To do so is certainly "inconsistent with" both

the express written opinion of the Supreme Court and the "spirit" of that
written opinion.
Obviously, "class action" certification of this litigation is very
inappropriate. This is especially so by reason of the late stage the
proceedings are now at.
Accordingly, the motion for "class action" certification must be
denied.
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CONCLUSION
The 'iCJle "issue" to be determined in this matter, following the Call
II dec1s1on, was the "reasonableness" of the "impact fee" as applied to
the ind1v1dual Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs presented absolutely no evidence
to show that the "impact fee" assessed against them was "unreasonable."
The trial court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims for their
failure to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the "impact fee"
was unreasonable.
There was presented substantial, competent evidence---most, i f not
all of which was unrebutted---to show that the Wescall Slbdivision created
needs within the municipality. The trial court found that the monies
collected from the Plaintiffs as the "impact fee" were used to address
those needs created by the Plaintiffs' development.
Not only does the Supreme Court not have the time to re-evaluate the
evidence submitted (as Plaintiffs seem to ask it to do), but for policy
reasons the Supreme Court should not attempt to overrule the trial court.
The trial court sits in an advantaged position to fully weigh the
evidence; its findings should not be disturbed. This is especially true
when there was substantial evidence presented to support those findings.
Plaintiffs' motion for "class action" certification is improperly
motivated. The Plaintiffs are in no way harmed if the action is not
certified, especially at this late stage. There are many reasons why the
action should not be certified as a class action; the trial court found
some of these reasons. Certainly the trial court ought to be granted some
deference in this type of decision which so severely hampers the trial
court and the party-litigants.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' appeal should be dismissed. The judgment of
the trial court should be affirmed and the Defendant be awarded its costs
in defending this action.
In the alternative, the case should be remanded to the district court
for the full presentation of the Defendant's case-in-chief.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of October, 1983.

~~
Attorney for Defendant

CERT IF IC ATE
I certify that I mailed two copies of the forego1ng RE'iPUNDlNf' S HR!Et to
Mr Robert J DeBry, 965 E. 4800 South, Salt Lake City, Utah R4117, this ~th
day of October, 1983.
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I:' THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN A'ID FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CALL and CLARK JEllKINS,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,

Civil No

VS

C-78-829

CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH
Defendant

The trial of the above-captioned matter on a procedural
bas is came on before this Court September 1 and 2, 1982

following the previous Pretrial Order of Judge Rigtrup, with

plaintiff being represented by Robert J. Debry, Esq , and
defendant being represented by Stephen G. Homer, Esq , City
Attorney for West Jordan.

At that procedural hearing, limited

issues of defendant's projected case in chief were presented
for the purpose of allowing discovery to be continued on

behalf of the plaintiff.

Then, on November 18, 1982, trial

cormnenced with plaintiffs producing witness Gerald Sharkey,
a C P.A., who went over the information which had been
obtained bv defendant as a result of the Ciscovery previously
allowed
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' presentation,
the defendant prior to putting on its case in chief, moved
the Court to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint or grant

Jud~ent

in favor of the defendant, and the Court at that juncture
requested that counsel for both sides provide written
me~oranda

conceniinP, their position so that the Court could

make the appropriate

rulin~.

The Court after having received

APPENDIX
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"A"

CALL, ET AL VS

CITY

OF WEST JORDAN

P.-\GE '.\/0

written memoranda on the t'.vo issues

LJ..:_.o>e'J

JC

>::!-,i::.

1 in· __,_ He~

now makes and enters its :vlemorandurr '.":lec1s:,)n :3.S .:-nLl
The two issues for deterrninatL)n are

1.

Whether the matter herein involved should be

certified for class action under Rule 23, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, and
2.

Whether defendant's motion to dismiss rilaintiffs'

Complaint or as characterized, grant a motion in favor of

defendant against the plaintiffs should be Rranted
On the first issue concerning the certification of
class action,

decisions of

the Court after
Jud~e

shown in the file,

havin~

reviewed the prior

Banks and Judge Winder as they are limitedly
together with the information supuorting

those prior motions and the present status of the file and
the authorities presented by defendant, now rules that the
matter should not be certified for class action, and the
motion for such certification is denied.
On the second issue,

it seems clear from the testimony

of the witness presented by the defendants, and also by an
examination of the accounting records as testified to by
Mr. Sharkey, that the impact fee assessed against the
Wescall Subdivision was not unreasonable, and on this issue
the Court finds that the plaintiffs failed to convince this
Court by a preponderance of the evidence that there was an
unreasonable fee assessed, and on this basis, therefore, the
Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
Complaint, and no cause for action.
Mr. Stephen G. Homer is directed to preoare the appropriate
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgrrient, not
inconsistent with this
Dated this

~emorandurn

2'2--

Decision

day of December,

1982

' ' l .~
I

_,
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STEPHEN G HOMER

West Jordan City Attorney
1850 West 7800 South
West Jordan, Utah 84084
Telephone 561-1463
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS,
Plaintiffs

FINDINGS OF FACT

VS

Civil No. C-78-829

CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH,
Defendant

The Court, having heard oral testimony on September 1st and 2nd and
November 18th, 1982 and having fully examined the exhibits received into
evidence and having heard the arguments of counsel thereon and having been
fully apprised in all premises herein, now enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Plaintiffs are the owners and developers of a 30-acre tract of
real property, located in the extremely southwestern corner of the city
limits of the City of West Jordan, said real property having been subdivided
and developed and being now known as the Wescall Subdivision.
2. The City of West Jordan, Utah, is a small community in the southwest
portion of Salt Lake County and is located between the Jordan River and the
Ocuirrh Mountains.

APPENDIX

"8"

3. On January 21, 1975, the then governing boclv ot the Cit'/

0f

,,est Jordan

1

adopted an ordinance [hereinafter "the Ordinance"l which required developers
of real property within the City to dedicate to the City seven percent of the
land so developed or to donate to the City the cash eouivalent thereof, said
donations and dedications to be used for flood control and park and recreation
purposes.
4. In July 1977 the Plaintiffs obtained approval from the governing body
of the City to develop their parcel of real property, which was subsequently
thereto developed into a residential subdivision consisting of 96 lots upon
which single-family residential dwellings have been constructed.
5. As a condition of subdivision development approval, the Plaintiffs
were required to donate to the City the sum of $16,576 as equivalent to seven
percent of the value of the land developed. Said $16,576 was received by the
City from the Plaintiffs in July 1977.
6. The $16,576 paid by the Plaintiffs and similar monies paid by other
developers for other subdivisions were placed into the general fund of the
City in an account bearing the designation "Flood Control". Over the years
since 1975, this "flood control'' account has had different accounting designations
applied to it. From the "flood control" account, expenditures were made by the
City for capital improvements for flood control and for parks and recreation
areas.
7. Since 1975 the City collected from developers approximately $525,000
in impact fees under the Ordinance.
8. Since 1975 the City expended from the aforementioned "flood control"
account approximately $1,200,000 for the construction of capital improvements

for tlood control projects and for parks and recreation areas in the city.

9. The difference between the money actually collected from the impact
fees paid by the developers pursuant to the Ordinance and the amounts actually
expended by the City represents a subsidy on the part of the City to the effect
that the City contributed additional amounts from other revenue sources to
finance the flood control projects, parks and recreation areas.
10. The City of West Jordan follows generally accepted accounting principles
for municipal governments and the provisions of state law by not having a fund
ba 1ance in the "flood contra l" account beyond the then-current budget year.
For each year since January 1975 the City has zeroed-out the fund balances in
the revenue portions of the "flood control" account. No evidence was presented
by the Plaintiffs to show that such funds were not expended in the City's fiscal
year (July to June) in which the impact fees had been collected.
11. Even though the individual dollars paid by the Plaintiffs cannot be
individually traced through the accounting records, the Court finds from a
preponderance of the evidence that the monies were spent on flood control
projects and parks and recreation areas for which the impact fee was assessed.
No instances were shown where monies from the "flood control" account of the
City were spent for items other than the capital improvements for flood control
and for parks and recreation areas. No unauthorized or improper expenditures,
such as gifts of personal property to elected or appointed officials, were
made from such "flood control" account.
12. The development of the Wescall Subdivision by the Plaintiffs generated
needs specifically for flood control and parks and recreation areas within the
city.
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13. The topography of the land within the City is such that the land
slopes downhill generally from west to east and from south to north. The
natural drainage patterns flow in a generally easternly or notheasternly
direction towards the Jordan River, the main natural drainage channel of the
Salt Lake valley.
14. Storm-water run-off created by and within the

~Jescall

Subdivision

will generally pass through the entire City before said run-off waters would
be discharged into the Jordan River.
15. Natural precipitation (rainfall) falling upon undeveloped land of
the soil and vegetation

ty~e

customarily found in the City of West Jordan will

run-off at a rate of 15 to 25 percent. Precipitation falling upon impervious
structures (such as driveways, sidewalks, streets, patios, roofs and other
structures and surfaces associated with the development of a modern residential
subdivision, including the Wescall Subdivision) will run-off at a rate of 90
percent.
lG. The development of the Wescall Subdivision has created and will continue
to create additional flood control run-off waters, which are for the most part
discharged into the natural drainage channel known as Bingham Creek, which
generally runs in an easternly direction through the city.
17. The City has undertaken a project known as the "Bingham Creek Project"
to pipe the drainage channel of Bingham Creek to avoid flooding in areas downstrear
from the Wescall Subdivision. The cost of this project will exceed several hundred
thousand dollars. The storm-water run-off created by the Wescall Subdivision
contributes in part to the costs of the Bingham Creek Project. Were it not for
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the additional storm-water run-off generated by the development of the Wescall
Subdivision, the Bingham Creek Project could utilize a smaller size of pipe to
handle a lesser quantity of storm-water run-off.
18. The development of the Wescall Subdivision, together with the
Plaintiffs' sale of the lots for residential purposes, has created and will
continue to create needs for parks and recreation areas for the residents of
the Subdivision.
19. In the Wescall Subdivision there are in excess of 400 new residents
who want and need parks and recreation areas.
20. To maintain the status quo ratio of parks acreage to population
existing at the time of the Wescall Subdivision development, the City had to
obtain in excess of one acre of additional park area.
21. To provide parks

a~d

recreation facilities in the area of the

Wescall Subdivision and one other neighboring subdivision, the City purchased
in 1977 the 2.5 acre "Booth Property" for use as a park. The cost to purchase
this land was $g,ooo per acre for a total of $22,500. The funds from this
purchase came from the aforementioned "flood control" account.
22. Prior to the adoption of the Ordinance, the governing body of the City
conducted a public hearing in which an overall master plan for the development
of the city was discussed. This hearing (held in August 1974) was conducted in
the West Jordan school auditorium so as to accomodate the large number of citizens
in attendance. The specific concept of flood control and having an impact fee
paid by new developers was discussed at that public hearing. The Ordinance was
prepared by the West Jordan Planning and Zoning Commission, even though the,
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City Attorney was responsible for the selection of the actua I lanquage used
in the text of the Ordinance. The Plaintiffs submitted no evidence to show that
a public hearing was not held or that the Planning and Zoning Commission did not
prepare the Ordinance.
23. The impact fees assessed under the Ordinance are calculated on the
basis of the percentage of the land developed or, in the alternative, the
cash value thereof. The Defendant disclosed the basis of its calculations to
the Plaintiffs who challenged the reasonableness of the impact fee.
24. The Plaintiffs were afforded numerous opportunities to examine the
financial and other records of the City and undertook, through their counsel
and other agents, such an examination. The City presented oral testimony and
documents during a two-day (September 1st and 2nd, 1982) evidentiary hearing
before the Court in which the City's witnesses explained the accounting records
and concepts for the benefit of the Plaintiffs and their attorney.
25. The Plaintiffs' accounting expert (Mr. Sharkey) examined the City's
records for approximately 23 hours. Mr Sharkey indicated that on the basis of
his examination of said records, he was unable to express an opinion as to how
the impact fees collected pursuant to the Ordinance were spent. Mr Sharkey
did concede that the expenditures from the "flood control" account, as claimed
by the City and reflected in the City's records admitted into evidence, had in
fact been made and that he (Mr. Sharkey) had found no improper or unauthorized
expenditures from said "flood contro.I" account or the ex1 stence of any kind of
"fund balance'' in which proceeds from the impact fees collected pursuant to
the Ordinance were being retained beyond the expiration of the then-current
fiscal year of the City.
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26. The court-appointed master, whose final report was expressly waived
by the Plaintiffs, indicated in his preliminary report to the Court that he
felt it would take approximately two hundred hours to fully examine the City's
financial records on the issues raised in this action.
27. There is a reasonable relationship between the impact fee assessed
against the Plaintiffs under the Ordinance and the needs created by the development
of the Wescall Subdivision.
28. The monies collected pursuant to the Ordinance from the Plaintiffs
were used by the City in such a way as to demonstrably benefit the Wescall
Subdivision and its residents, even though there may have been a secondary
benefit granted to other subdivisions and residents.
29. The impact fee under the Ordinance did not require the Plaintiffs,
as developers of the Wescall Subdivision, to bear more than their share of the
capital costs in relation to the benefits conferred. That portion of the impact
fee used for parks and recreation areas is equitable in light of the relative
benefits conferred on, as well as the relative burdens previously borne and
yet to be borne by the Wescall Subdivision and its residents in comparison
with the other properties in the city. The impact fee assessed under the
Ordinance did not exceed the amounts sufficient to equalize the relative benefits
and burdens of the Wescall Subdivision and other properties. The impact fee
assessed against the Plaintiffs under the Ordinance was utilized solely for
the construction of capital improvements (flood control projects and parks and
recreation areas) made necessary by the development of the Wescall Subdivision.
30. The putative class is not so numerous that joinder of all parties
39

-

' '

is impracticable.
31. The defenses which could be asserted bv the

~efPndant

are not

typical for all members of the class; specifically, whrlt 'nay be a 'reasonable
fee for one subdivision may be "unreasonable" for another, when the specific
needs, etc. of that latter subdivision are examined.
32. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would
not create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications or adjudications
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members
not parties to the action.
33. Questions of law or fact common to the members of the putative class
do not predominate over questions affecting only individual members.
Entered this

~ of~
day

1983.

DAVID B DEE, District
CERTIFICATE

J~;;: ~-'- ,,.

IJ'0

I certify that I mailed a copy of the proposed FINDINGS OF FACT to Mr Robert
DeBry, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 965 E. 4800 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
this 14th day of January, 1983.
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. ''
HOMER
Jordan City Attorney
1850 West 7800 South
~est Jordan, Utah
84084
Telephone 561-1463
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS,
Plaintiffs

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs

Civil No. C-78-829

CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH,
Defendant

The Court, having heard oral testimony on September lst and 2nd and
November 18th, 1982 and having fully examined the exhibits received into
evidence and having heard the arguments of counsel thereon and having been
fully apprised in all premises herein and having heretofor entered Findings
of Fact, now enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
l.

The City has disclosed to the Plaintiffs the basis upon which the

impact fee under the 1975 Ordinance was calculated.

The burden of showing

failure to comply with the constitutional standard of reasonableness in
this matter is upon the Plaintiffs, as challengers.
2.

The Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to present evidence to

show the dedication and/or donation required of them had no reasonable

APPENDIX
l11

"C"

relationship to the needs for flood control or parks

dnd r~Lr~dtrun

facilities created by the Wescall Subdivision.
3.

The Plaintiffs had the burden to show that the impact fee assessed

under the Ordinance was unreasonably applied against them.
4.

The Ordinance in question is entitled to a presumption of con-

stitutional validity.

The Utah Supreme Court has expressly upheld the

facial constitutionality and validity of the Ordinance.
5.

The Plaintiffs have failed to show by a preponderance of the

evidence that the Ordinance was unreasonable, in that the dedication
required of the Plaintiffs had no reasonable relationship to the needs for
flood control or parks and recreation facilities created by their subdivision.
6.

There is a reasonable relationship between the impact fee assessed

against the Plaintiffs under the Ordinance and the needs created by the
development of the Wescall Subdivision.
7.

Monies collected pursuant to the Ordinance from the Plaintiffs were

used by the City in such a way to demonstrably benefit the Wescall Subdivision
and its residents, even though there may have been a secondary benefit granted
to the other subdivisions and residents.
8.

The impact fee under the Ordinance did not require the Plaintiffs,

as developers of the Wescall Subdivision, to bear more than their share of
the capital costs in relation to the benefits conferred.

That portion of the

impact fee used for parks and recreation areas is equitable in light of the
relative benefits conferred on, as well as the relative burdens previously
borne and yet to be borne by Wescall Subdivision and its residents in com42

parison with the other properties in the City.

The impact fee assessed

under the Ordinance did not exceed the amounts sufficient to equalize the
relative benefits and burdens of the Wescall Subdivision and other properties.

The impact fee assessed against the Plaintiffs under the Ordinance

was utilized solely for the construction of capital improvements (flood
control projects and parks and recreation areas) made necessary by the
development of the Wescall Subdivision.
9.

The impact fee collected from the Plaintiffs was used by the City

in such a way as to demonstrably benefit the Wescall Subdivision even though
there was a secondary benefit incurred for other subdivisions and residents.
10.

The impact fee under the Ordinance does not require the newly

developed properties to bear more than their fair share of the capital costs
in relation to the benefits conferred.

The amounts required of the Plain-

tiffs are actually less than their fair share of the costs for the needs
created by the development of thP. Wescall Subdivision.
11.

The fact that there may be other funding methods (such as bonding

and increasing the property tax mill levy) available to the City to raise
revenues from which to construct flood-control projects and parks and
recreation areas, as suggested by the Plaintiffs, does not invalidate the
impact fee method (under the Ordinance) chosen by the City to pay for the
costs in solving such needs.

These measures for alternative sources of

revenue ignore the concept of an "impact fee", which has been approved by
the Utah Supreme Court.
12.

The accounting and financial records which have been maintained by
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the City to account for the impact fees collected under

th~ ~1·d1nance

are

and have been maintained in compliance with generally accepted accounting
principles and the relevant provisions of Utah law perta1n1ng to such
records.
13.

The Ordinance was valid and promulgated by the governing body of

the City of West Jordan.

It was not shown by a preponderance of the

evidence that the City failed to comply with the provisions of Section 109-25, Utah Code Annotated, in the promulgation of the Ordinance.
14.

The fact that the initial studies prepared by the engineering firm

for the City indicated that the impact fee was to be $300 per acre does not
render the impact fee actually charged the Plaintiffs in this case to be
"unreasonable".

In this regard, the Court determined that upon the basis

of the testimony concerning the needs created by the development, together
with such other factors as inflation and the fact that the engineering study
only addressed flood control needs and did not take into account parks and
recreation areas, sustain the reasonableness of the fee.
15.

The putative class is not so numerous that joinder of all party

is impracticable.

16.

The defenses which could be asserted by the Defendant are not typical

for all members of the class; specifically, what may be a "reasonable" fee
for one subdivision may be "unreasonable'' for another, when the specific needs,
etc. of that latter subdivision are examined.
17.

Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class

would not create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications or
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ddJudications which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the action herein.
18.

Questions of law or fact common to the members of the putative

class do not predominate over questions effecting only individual members.
19.

The Court has considered the extent and nature of any litigation

concerning the controversy already commenced by other members of the class
and the Court takes notice that no other action against the City on this
particular issue have been previously filed.

The Court likewise has

considered the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of claims in the particular forum and has also considered the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of the class action, particularly
at this late date where certification of the class was sought on the first
day of trial.

The Court finds that no notice could reasonably be given to

the other class members involved in the controversy and accordingly the
Court determines that a class action is not superior to other available

''thod< ' ' ' th• ' ' ' ' ood •ffici~icotioo of th• coot''''''Y·
Entered this~ day of

, 1983.
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DAVID B DEE, Judge of the District Court
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I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing proposed CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to
Mr Robert DeBry, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 965 E. 4800 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84117 this 14th day of January, 1983.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

-------------------------------------------------------------------------JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS,
Plaintiffs
VS

JUDGMENT

CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH,

Civil No. C-78-829

Defendant

-------------------------------------------------------------------------The Court, having heard oral testimony on September lst and 2nd and
November 18th, 1982 and having fully examined the exhibits received into
evidence and having heard the arguments of counsel thereon and having been
fully apprised in all premises herein and having heretofor entered Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED:
l.

The impact fee assessed against and paid by the Plaintiffs is con-

stitutionally reasonable.

The impact fee has not been "applied" to the

Plaintiffs in an impermissable or unconstitutional manner.
2.

The impact fee Ordinance adopted by the City on January 21, 1975 and

the impact fee assessed and collected thereunder from the Plaintiffs are
valid.

All Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant are dismissed, with

APPENDIX

"D"

~

J__

; ... ".:

prejudice, and final judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant.
3.

The Defendant is awarded its costs in defending this action.

Counsel for the Defendant shall submit to the Court and to counsel for the
Plaintiffs a written Memorandum of Costs Incurred within 5 days of entry
of this Judgment.
Entered this

~day of

tit,,

1983.

BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE

J

I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing proposed JUDGMENT to Mr Robert
DeBry, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 965 E. 4800 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
this 14th day of January, 1983.

